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First version: 21 December 2007 1 Introduction
There is a general trend towards more pension funding. This trend will have important
implications for the distribution of risks in society. In this article, we explore the optimal
design of two-tier pension systems in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model
with endogenous labor supply. While the ﬁrst tier allows for both systematic redistribution
and risk sharing between the young and old generation, the second pillar only allows for
intergenerational risk sharing, as it is fully funded. Funded pension beneﬁts can be of the
deﬁned contribution (DC) type or of the deﬁned beneﬁt( D B )t y p e . O ft h el a t t e rt y p e ,
we shall explore a deﬁned real beneﬁt (DRB) system, where the pension beneﬁti se xa n t e
determined in real terms and a deﬁn e dw a g e - i n d e x e db e n e ﬁt (DWB) system, where the
beneﬁt is linked to the realized wage rate. With a DC fund, no risk sharing is possible
through the second pension pillar because the entire value of the fund is paid out to the
retired. Hence, the social optimum can generally not be replicated. With a DRB fund,
optimal risk sharing requires wage risks to be shared via the ﬁrst pillar. However, this
requires a distortionary pension premium to be levied on wages, which, in turn, distorts
the labor supply. Hence, also with a DRB fund, the social optimum can generally not
be achieved. The only system that enables the market economy to replicate the social
optimum is a properly designed DWB system. Such a system allows a complete separation
between systematic redistribution, which is the task of the ﬁrst pillar, and optimal risk
sharing, which is the domain of the second pillar. This way, labor supply is undistorted
and the ﬁr s tb e s tc a nb em i m i c k e d .
The closest antecedent to this paper is Beetsma and Bovenberg (2007). There, however,
the labor supply is exogenous and DRB and DWB are equally desirable arrangements.
Other works on intergenerational risk sharing via social security systems, though using
diﬀerent frameworks, are Hassler and Lindbeck (1997), Krueger and Kubler (2002), De
Menil and Sheshinski (2003), Matsen and Thogerson (2004), Wagener (2004) and Gottardi
and Kubler (2006).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and
solves for the social planner’s solution. Section 3 presents the decentralized economy and
the diﬀerent second pillar pension systems. In Section 4 we explore the conditions for
a market economy to replicate the social planner solution. Finally, Section 5 provides a
short conclusion.
2 The command economy
2.1 Individuals and preferences
The model represents a closed economy. It incorporates two periods (0 and 1)a n dt w o
generations. In period 0, a generation of mass 1 is born. This generation lives through
periods 0 and 1. We call this generation the “old generation”. The representative agent
1within this generation features the following utility function:
u(cy,0)+βE0 [u(co)], (1)
where cy,0 denotes consumption when this agent is young, while co represents consumption
when it is old. Further, β i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ra n dE 0 [.] is the expectations operator
conditional on information before any of the shocks (see below) have occurred. We assume
uc > 0 and ucc < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
In period 1, a new generation of mass 1 is born. This generation is termed the “young
generation” and it lives just for this period. The lives of the two generations thus overlap
in period 1. The representative individual of the young generation features the utility
function:
u(cy) − z (N), (2)
which is deﬁned over consumption cy and endogenous work eﬀort N in period 1.W e
assume that zN > 0 and zNN > 0.
2.2 Production
In period 0 each old generation member receives an exogenous non-storable endowment
η0. Production is endogenous only in period 1, when the two generations co-exist. It is
then given by
Y = AF (K,N), (3)
where A denotes stochastic total factor productivity, K represents the aggregate capital
stock and N is the aggregate labor input. The production function exhibits constant
returns to scale. In our closed economy, the capital stock K is the result of investment in
t h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d0.
2.3 Resource constraints
The resource constraints in periods 0 and 1 are given by, respectively,
cy,0 = η0 − K, (4)
cy + co = AF (K,N)+( 1− δ)K, (5)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the stochastic depreciation rate of the capital stock. The left-hand
sides of these expressions denote aggregate consumption in the economy. The right-hand
side of (4) represents total endowment income minus the investment in physical capital.
The right-hand side of (5) stands for total production plus what is left over of the capital
stock after taking depreciation into account.
22.4 The social planner’s solution
T h ev e c t o ro ft h es t o c h a s t i cs h o c k sh i t t i n gt h ec o m m a n de c o n o m yi sξ ≡ {A,δ}.I t i s
unknown in period 0, but becomes known before period 1 variables are determined. As a
benchmark, we consider a (utilitarian) social planner who aims to maximize the sum of
the discounted expected utilities of all individuals. In period 0, this planner commits to
an optimal state-contingent plan. This yields the following optimality conditions:
cy = co,∀ ξ, (6)








where rkn ≡ AFK −δ, which in the sequel we will refer to as the net-of-depreciation return
on capital,a n dFK and FN are the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively.
(In the following we drop function arguments whenever this does not create ambiguities.)
If a decentralized equilibrium is to replicate the planner’s solution, conditions (6) — (8)
need to be met in addition to the resource constraints (4) and (5). Condition (6) equalizes
the marginal utilities of the two generations, while condition (7) sets the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and work equal to minus the marginal product of
labor. Finally, expression (8) is an Euler equation.
3 The decentralized economy
This section describes the decentralized market economy in which individuals and ﬁrms
maximize their objective functions under the relevant constraints. A key question will be
which pension system can replicate the command optimum. We can interpret (6) as the
condition for ex-ante trade in risks between the young and old generations in complete
ﬁnancial markets. However, in a decentralized economy, the two generations cannot trade
risk in ﬁnancial markets, because the young generation is born only after the shocks have
materialized. Other institutions thus have to replace this missing market and we shall
explore to what extent the pension system can perform that role.
The timing of events in the market economy will be as follows. In period 0,t h eo l d
generation take their investment and consumption decisions. Beginning of period 1,t h e
shocks A and δ materialize. Finally, ﬁrms take hiring and production decisions, while
young individuals decide on their labour supply and consumption.
3.1 The pension systems
The ﬁrst pillar in the pension system is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) part composed of a
lump-sum part and a wage-indexed part. The young pay a (possibly negative) lump-sum
amount θ
p and a fraction θ
w of their wage income to the old. The total systematic transfer
from the young to the old via the ﬁrst pillar is θ
p + θ
wwN.
3The second pillar of the pension system consists of a pension fund that collects contri-
butions θ
f from old-generation members in period 0, invests these contributions and pays
out beneﬁts to the old generation in period 1. If we denote the rate of return that the old
generation receives on their contribution by rf, then the total payout is (1 + rf)θ
f.






The real bonds provide a non-stochastic return of r and physical capital provides the
net-of-depreciation rate of return rkn. The actual or net return on the assets held by the










Depending on the pension scheme and the fund’s investment scheme, there can be a
diﬀerence between the payout and the value of the fund equal to (ra − rf)θ
f. The young
are the residual claimants of the fund and receive this diﬀerence.
Since the second pillar is fully funded, the contributions equal the expected value to
the old generation of the beneﬁts they collect in period 1. This implies that there is no
redistribution of wealth between the generations. We analyze risksharing opportunities
for the cases where the second pillar is of the deﬁned contribution, deﬁned beneﬁti nr e a l
terms or deﬁned beneﬁt indexed to wages type.
We will summarise the net ﬂows from the young generation to the old generation by
the generational accounts. In a closed economy the generational accounts always add up










3.1.1 Deﬁn e dc o n t r i b u t i o n( D C )
If the second pillar pension is of the DC type, assets and liabilities are always equal, not
only ex ante in period 0 when contributions and pension fund investments are made, but
also ex post when beneﬁts are paid out. Hence, rf = ra a n dt h es e c o n dp i l l a rp r o v i d e sn o
intergenerational risk-sharing opportunities in addition to those already provided by the






3.1.2 Deﬁned real beneﬁt( D R B )
In case the system is of the DRB type, the old receive a safe real beneﬁt Bdrb in period 1.
The system is fully funded if it does not produce ex ante redistribution between the two
4generations. Because the pension beneﬁt is safe, the return on the pension contribution
must be equal to the return on a safe bond:
r
f = r. (13)
The young receive what is left over of the pension fund after the old have been paid
their safe real beneﬁt. Hence, the young absorb the mismatch risk of the pension fund
and each one of them receives
(r
a − r)θ















where the second equality has employed (9) to eliminate θ
f.A st h eﬁrst line shows, the
young in eﬀect issue an amount of debt θ
f to the old and invest the resources for their
own risk according to the portfolio of the pension fund. Hence, depending on the equity
investment of the pension fund kf, the young eﬀectively participate in the stock market,
thereby sharing in equity (productivity and depreciation) risks with the old generation.










3.1.3 Deﬁned wage-indexed beneﬁt( D W B )
Under a DWB system, the pension fund beneﬁti si n d e x e dt ot h ew a g er a t e . T h i sw a y ,
the second pillar of the pension system is able to share wage risks. As we shall see, this
allows the PAYG pillar to focus purely on redistribution and avoids the need to levy a
distortionary pension premium on wage income.








dwb captures the ﬁxed (non-stochastic) factor that links the beneﬁtt ot h ew a g e
rate w. It is important to notice that the individual pension beneﬁti sl i n k e dt ot h e
aggregate wage income. Hence, a change in θ
dwb leaves work eﬀort unaﬀected, because an
individual person’s labor supply decision has a negligible eﬀect on aggregate wage income.
The return the old generation receives is stochastic since the wage rate is determined by







f (w − E0w). (16)
This clearly shows the stochastic nature of rf. If the realised wage rate exceeds the
expected wage rate, the payout of the pension fund is higher than expected. Full funding





























The young in eﬀect issue a wage-indexed bond to the old and invest the borrowed resources
in debt and physical capital, conform the portfolio decisions of the pension fund. Because
wage risk is not traded in ﬁnancial markets, the DWB pension fund always suﬀers from
mismatch risk. It thereby creates new possibilities for risk trading. Speciﬁcally, the DWB
fund allows the young generation not only to trade in equity, but also to diversify away
wage risk.















3.2 Individual budget constraints and generational accounts
The old receive their deterministic period 0 endowment η0 and spend this on current
consumption, pay the mandatory pension fund contribution θ
f, and invest the rest in
physical capital and real bonds.
cy,0 = η0 −
¡
b + k + θ
f¢
, (19)
Consumption of the young and old generations in period 1 is:










where b denotes real debt directly held by the old and k is the direct claim of the old on
the capital stock in period 1.
3.3 Individual and ﬁrm optimization
We solve the model by backwards induction. A young person in period 1 chooses labor
eﬀort N and consumption cy to maximize its utility, (2), subject to its budget constraint
(20). The ﬁrst-order conditions yield:
zN (N)/uc (cy)=( 1− θ
w)w. (22)
A continuum of perfectly competitive representative ﬁrms, with mass normalized to unity,
produce according to (3) and maximize proﬁts AF (K,N) − wN − rkK over N and K,
t a k i n gt h ew a g er a t ea n dr e n t a lr a t eo fc a p i t a la sg i v e n .T h eﬁrst-order conditions are:
AFN = w, (23)
AFK = r
k. (24)
6In period 0, the old generation decides on the allocation of its savings over the various
assets. They maximize (1) over b and k,w h e r ecy,0 and co are given by (19) and (21),
respectively. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:








= uc (cy,0). (26)
3.4 Market equilibrium conditions
The goods market equilibrium conditions in periods 0 and 1 are (4) and (5), respectively.
Given that the mass of the old generation is 1, equilibrium in the capital market is:
K = k + k
f. (27)
Combining (22) and (23) yields the labor market equilibrium condition:
zN (N)/uc (cy)=( 1− θ
w)AFN. (28)
Finally, with zero net outstanding debt, debt market equilibrium in period 0 requires that:
b + b
f =0 . (29)
4 The optimality of pension systems
We study how the decentralized market economy can replicate the social optimum with an
appropriate choice of the pension system. We design the appropriate two pillar pension
system (a PAYG ﬁrst pillar and a funded second pillar) to ensure that the planner’s
solution derived in Section 2 is replicated in a decentralized market economy. We do this
using the optimality and market equilibrium conditions derived above.
The following lemma, which is easy to prove, provides the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the replication of the social optimum:
Lemma 1 When a policy produces co = cy and zN (N)/uc (cy)=AFN for all possible
realizations of the shock vector ξ, then the competitive equilibrium reproduces the socially-
optimal allocation under all types of funded pension systems.





dwb, Bdrb, kf and bf are not contingent on the shocks. Although the potential
objections to making these parameters shock-contingent are not modelled explicitly, fre-
quent changes in the pension parameters would inevitably lead to political struggles and
introduce additional uncertainty not directly linked to the fundamental economic shocks
themselves.
7First, consider the condition cy = co. Combining this with (20) and (21), replication












Hence, if individual proﬁt income plus the scrap value of capital per old individual,
¡
1+rkn¢
K, exceeds individual wage income per young individual, AFNN,t h eo l dw o u l d
have more per-capita resources for consumption in period 1 than the young. Intergenera-
tional equality of period 1 consumption requires the generational accounts to oﬀset these
income diﬀerences.
Reproduction for all shock realizations of (7) by the market condition (22) is possible
if and only if
θ
w =0 . (31)
In other words, replication of the social optimum requires the elimination of the wage-
linked part of the ﬁrst pillar.
4.1 A DC system
We want to establish whether the DC system is able to replicate the social optimum. The
available instruments are the investment composition (kf, bf) of the fund and the parame-
ter combination (θ
p, θ
w) characterizing the PAYG system. However, because individual
investment decisions exactly oﬀset the pension fund investments, only θ
p and θ
w remain
as potential instruments to aﬀect allocations.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The DC system is generally unable to replicate the social optimum when
t h e r ei sa tl e a s to n es o u r c eo fs h o c k s .
Proof. Under DC, Go = θ
p + θ
wAFNN. Substitution into (30) yields as a nec-





2 [AFK +( 1− δ)]K. We see immediately that with depreciation shocks, this expression
cannot hold for all possible shock realizations for constant (θ
p, θ
w). With productivity
shocks only, the condition requires that θ
w diﬀers from 0,w h i c hc o n t r a d i c t s( 3 1 ) .
With productivity shocks only, a DC system fails to reproduce the planner’s solution
because it would require setting θ
w > 0, which introduces ineﬃcient distortions in the
labor market. With depreciation shocks, the DC system also fails on account of the fact
that there is no way that the elderly can share the depreciation risk with the younger
generation.
4.2 A DRB system
The design of the DRB pension fund requires the choice of four policy parameters:
θ
f,Bdrb,b f and kf. Restriction (9) and the full-funding requirement θ
f = Bdrb/(1 + r)
8leave only two parameters to be freely selected. We take these to be bf and kf. Further,
the fund’s investment in debt is not a source of mismatch between the assets and liabilities
of the pension fund and therefore does not aﬀect the equilibrium. Hence, only kf is left
as the key parameter to be chosen for the design of the second pillar.
Even though the young now share in equity risks, we have:
Proposition 3 The DRB system is generally unable to replicate the social optimum.





kf. Substitution into (30) and rewriting














[AFK +( 1− δ)]K.





to produce equality of the constant terms and the
shockcoeﬃcients on both sides of this expression. The solution is kf = k, θ
p = −(1 + r)kf
and θ
w = 1
2.T h es o l u t i o nf o rθ
w contradicts (31).
Hence, replication of the social optimum requirement (6) would require risk sharing
via the wage-linked part of the ﬁrst pension pillar. However, this would distort the labor
supply, implying that the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved with a DRB second pillar.
4.3 A DWB system
The optimal design of the DWB pension fund requires the choice of θ
f,θ
dwb,b f and kf.
With restriction (9) and the full-funding requirement (17), only two parameters remain
to be chosen. For this, we take θ
dwb and kf, which determine, respectively, the size of the
second pillar and the composition of the pension fund’s investment portfolio.
The key result of this paper is:
Proposition 4 The combination of a properly designed ﬁr s tp i l l a ra n das e c o n dD W B
pillar replicates the social optimum for all possible shock combinations. The appropriate






w =0 , θ
dwb = 1
2 and
kf = k,w h e r eθ
f follows from (17).










Substitute this into (30). It is easy to check that the proposed solution ensures that the
resulting expression holds for all possible shock combinations. Because θ
w =0is part of
the proposed solution, also (7) is fulﬁlled for all possible shock combinations.
The appropriate pension arrangement completely separates the respective roles of both
pension system pillars,w h e r et h er o l eo ft h eP A Y Gﬁrst pillar is to provide the right
amount of systematic redistribution and that of the DWB second pillar is to provide for
optimal risk sharing. This contrasts with the DRB system where a distortionary pension
premium was needed to share wage risks between the two generations.
95C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that a two-tier pension arrangement with a DWB second tier is
able to combine optimal intergenerational redistribution (via the ﬁrst pillar) with optimal
intergenerational risk sharing (via the second pillar), without distorting the labor market.
In this regard, a DWB second pillar is preferable to a DRB second pillar. In practice,
the separation of risk sharing from redistribution under DWB is likely to yield additional
beneﬁts, such as providing more transparency about the consequences of a speciﬁcp e n s i o n
system design for diﬀerent generations and facilitating a potential reform of the ﬁrst pillar
if there is a need to change the amount of systematic redistribution between generations.
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10Appendix
A Derivation of the planner’s solution
In period 0, this planner commits to a state-contingent plan. Hence, the consumption
levels and the labor supply in period 1 are functions of the shocks, so that we write
co = co(ξ),c y = cy (ξ) and N = N (ξ).W ec a nw r i t et h ep l a n n e r ’ sp r o b l e ma s :
$ =
Z ·
[u(cy,0)+βu(co(ξ))] + β [u(cy (ξ)) − z (N (ξ))]
+βλ1 (ξ)[AF (K,N (ξ)) + (1 − δ)K − cy (ξ) − co (ξ)]
¸
f (ξ)dξ
+ λ0 [η0 − K − cy,0].
Here, f (ξ) stands for the probability density function of the vector of stochastic shocks
ξ. The Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraints in period 0 and 1 are denoted by
λ0 and λ1 (ξ), respectively. Maximization of the planner’s program with respect to cy,0,









uc (cy (ξ)) = λ1 (ξ),∀ξ,
uc (co (ξ)) = λ1 (ξ),∀ξ,
zN (N (ξ)) = λ1 (ξ)AFL,∀ξ.
By eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from these ﬁrst-order conditons, we obtain
uc (cy)=uc (co),∀ξ,
(7) and (8). This reduces to (6) - (8).
BP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
Add equation (20) and equation (21). Using rkn = AFK − δ, the resulting equation can
be simpliﬁed to (5), which for given K coincides with the planner’s resource constraint.
The combination of (a) expressions co = cy and zN (N)/uc (cy)=AFN,w h i c hi nt h e
proposition hold by assumption, (b) expression (5), (c) equation (26), and (d) equation
(19) exactly coincides with the system (4) - (8) to be solved under the planner. Hence,
the decentralized economy is solved for the same combination(s) {cy,0,c y,c o,N,K} as in
the social planner’s problem.
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